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J apanese Substitution of Multilateralism 
for Bilateralism: A Case of Foreign 
Economic Assistance in 1987 
Kozo Kato<*) 
In the period of 1985-87， Japan's response to western criticism of its 
contributions to the alliance had significant new elements. These 
were the implementation of the Maekawa Report， a steady increase 
in Japanese defense spending going beyond the one-percent of GNP 
limit， and increased aid to the developing countries. They represent-
ed watershed in postwar Japanese history because出eyclarified 
Japan's wi1lingness as one of the secondary powers， tocooperate with 
and contribute to international society as tangible J apanese efforts 
commensurate with its economic power.ωThe purpose of this article 
is to show how the J apanese government took a new strategy of 
multileralism in the foreign economic assistance policy as a conscious 
response to the U. S. criticism of J apan stemming from the huge trade 
imbalance in 1987. The political implication of this shift toward 
international cooperation is that the J apanese government and the 
business community in effect substituted mutilateralism (cooperation 
< * ) Assistant Professor， Institute of Social Sciences University of Tsu-
kuba 
( 1) For example， the year 1987 became one of ]apan's most generous 手
years in terms of forgign aid. ]apan's Official Development Assis- ~ 
tance (ODA) reached $7.454 bilion， rising 32.3% over the previous 
year in dollar terms (Ministry of Foreign Affairs， 1989， p.7). 
Although ODA was only one component of total financial flows to 
developing countries， this manifest trend explicitly illustrates the 
turning point of ]apanese aid policy in its history. 
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bilateralism foτ with internationaI development organizations) 
(Japan-U. S. relationship) in foreign aid policy. 
1. Theoretical Purpose 
Although there exists a pretty weIl-known and widely accepted 
definition，C2l the concept of international regime has attracted authors 
of strikingly different theoretical standpoints， and therefore has 
caused considerable amount of confusion about the usage and useful-
ness of the concept. This diversity and confusion happens because 
the concept was introduced by “modified struturalists ，(realists)" into 
the field of international relations as what conventional realism could 
not explain. 
The regime literature originated from the effort to explain what 
conventional realists failed to explain --a relatively stable interna-
tional economic order in the 1970s and 1980s in spite of America's 
decline as a hegemonic power. According to the realists argument， 
actors' characteristics is held constant一一一theyare unified and 
egoistic self-interest maximizers， who make rational choices. That 
is， political idealism， altruism and irrationality as the origins of 
orders are irrelevant. The regime literature is basicaIly rationalistic. 
Realists assume that the origins of order exist completely outside of 
actors. Therefore， they regarded the stable economic order after 
World War I to be sustained by a dominant power， a hegemon， and 
expected its collapse after American hegemonic decline司
International regimes have been treated as intervening variables， 
which intermediate basic causal variables --egoistic self-interest， 
political power and norms and principles -一一andcreate cooperation 
and order among actors. Therefore， inthe modified structuralist 
view， the origins of order basically lie outside of actors， and in this 
meaning， modified structuralist stand well within the conventional 
One of the most widely accepted definition is Stephan Krasner's: 
“Regimes can be definde as sets of implicit or explicit principles 
norms rules， and decision making procedures around which actors' 
expectations converge in a given area of international relations" 
(Krasner， 1983， p.1)ー
( 2 ) 
???
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realist stance. Of course， as realists， they assume states as primary 
and unified actors. Robert Keohane， relying on institutional argu・
ments in microeconomics， developed elegant functionalist expecta-
tions why the demands for regimes originate _-“political market 
failure，"“transaction cost" etc.∞ln other words， we may explain 
that one widely accepted way of achieving policy adjustment among 
industrialized states is through the activities of a hegemonic power to 
build what Keohane calls “international regimes" that serve 
hegemon's own interests and are also sufficiently compatible with the 
interests of subordinate countries. 
This essay asks whether or not the modified realist explanation on 
the international regimes can be well applied to ]apanese foreign 
economic policies in the mid-1980s when the international system 
clearly 'experienced structural change due to ] apan's meteoric rise as 
a financial superpower. If the conventional realistic view holds true 
of the regime， the flow of ]apanese financial resources to the Latin 
American region must have been shrinking， especially after 1982 
when debt crisis emerged as a serious problem that hampers financial 
flows from industrialized countries. As far as J apan pursues its 
narrow-minded interests based on egoistic motivations， and it takes 
advantage of damaging effects of the debt crisis on出eU. S. econ-
omy， the capital flows to Latin American countries were supposed to 
be tapering off， despite the U. S. increasing pressures (gaiaおu)on 
Japan. On the other hand， if]apan's contribution to the international 
regime is derived from its interest in international cooperation for 
the sake of sustaining current international economic order， instead 
of serving directly to interests of hegemon itself， the capital flows 
would be increasing.(4) Therefore， the theoretical implication of this 
paper is to evaluate the plausibility of the view of the modified 
realists that secondary powers in the current international regimes 
??????
Keohane， 1984， chap. 6. 
This puzzle is echoed in Duncan Snidal's article. Snidal claims that 
there needs to be a clear distinction between two different models of 
regimes: benevolent model and coercive model. See Snidal， 1985. 
( 3 ) 
( 4 ) 
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make contribution to maintaining the international political eco-
nomic order because they find it in their interests to respond to 
external constraints and opportunities derived from structural 
change in the world economy and then to reciprocate cooperation 
based on strategic rationality， especially under the condition of the 
marked interdependence in postwar years. 
To answer the question， Japanese financial flow to Latin American 
countries is to be examined as a crucial case. This case is crucial not 
only because Latin America is traditionally regarded as under the U. 
S. sphere of influence to which J apan is imposed increasing pressures 
for expanding its contribution， but also there exist overt conflicts of 
interest between ]apanese and American private sectors over appro-
priateness to inject further financial resources in the debt-ridden 
region. Thus the ]apanese government was forced to face a political 
di1emma during the period between faithful commitment to the vital 
bilateral relations with the United States and strong belief in market 
based， liberal resource allocation to developing countries within a 
framework of international regimes. 
The Structural Change in the World Economy: Japan's 
Rise as a Financial Superpower 
From the perspective of ]apan's international environment， the 
year 1987 saw the confluence of two factors: the bilateral conflict 
with the United States caused by the unprecedented trade imbalance 
on the one hand， the worldwide struggle for dealing with the deterior田
ating debt crisis in Latin America on the other. The resulting policy 
of the ]apanese government was to dedicate the nation's capital 
surplus through multilateral cooperation with international develop-
ment organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF)， 
the W orld Bank (IBRD) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). 
During the 1970s-80s period， there was a series of major economic 
shocks in international markets for traded goods and in international 
capital markets. The oil-price rises of 1973-74 and 1979-80 touched 
off major changes in the terms of trade between manufactured goods 
and raw materials. These price shifts were accompanied by slow-
2. 
??????
?????
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downs in world trade in 1974-75 and again in 1979-83， largely because 
of recessionary conditions in the advanced industrial countries whose 
markets had been the source of dynamism of world trade in出e1960s. 
The ensuing world recession during 1979-83 was the longest in post 
war history and affected both developed and developing countries.(5) 
The major challenge in world capital-market conditions occurred in 
1974司 79，in the wake of the first oil-price shock of 1973-74. As the 
advanced industrial countries went into a simultaneous recession， 
traditional corporate borrowers disappeared from the market. 
Consequently， the banks began to see Third W orld governments as 
attractive cIients. This tendency increased as oil exporters deposited 
much of their increased revenues with the major international banks 
in 1973-74 and 1979. Previously， most of the external funding avail-
able to the developing countries had come from the savings of the 
industrial economies， and much of this had been distributed through 
official government channel or through multi1ateral institutions， such 
as the IMF or the World Bank. After 1973-74 the oil-exporting 
countries began to provide substantial savings to be recycled by the 
commercial banks. The dramatic growth in the supply of loanable 
funds from this savings and the resulting competition among commer-
cial banks pushed down the real rate of interest on commercial bank 
loans. The low and sometimes negative real interest rates resulting 
from such conditions enhanced the attractiveness of external borrow-
ing as a way to finance continued growth， despite adverse shifts in the 
terms of trade and temporarily reduced export prospects for many 
countries. (6) 
In， 1979， however， world credit-market conditions began to tighten 
as result of the simultaneous introduction of restrictive monetary 
po1icies in several industrial economy， most significant， the United 
States.(7) These policies drove reaI interest rates sharply upward and 
began to attract capital fIows from the developing to the developed 
Kahler， 1985. 
Stal1ings， 1987. 
Frieden， 1987. 
( 5 ) 
( 6 ) 
( 7 ) 
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economies. Consequently， during the 1980s， less developing countries 
were suffering from a lack of funds needed to finance economic 
growth. Although official development assistance from industrial-
ized countries to the third world had increased in absolute terms， it
was private capital， previously the main source of financing for third 
world countries， that has been drying up. The cut-off of the private 
capital deteriorated economic conditions and caused the devastating 
debt crisis especially in Latin American countries. By late 1985， the 
debt crisis was stil unresolved in the three years since Mexico's 
moratorium on debt service in 1982. Even those countries such as 
Brazil that were successful in running trade surpluses were mired in 
recession. Real per capita growth in Latin American countries was 
negative between 1981 and 1983 and stagnant in succeeding years. 
This stagnation was mainly the result of the policies that permitted 
debt service to continue. on the one hand， the principaI source of the 
trade surplus was a lower volume of imports， which often brought a 
fal in production. On the other hand， the combination of high debt 
service payments and low capital inflow led to large net transfers 
from Latin American to the creditor countries， and thus a decline in 
both investment and consumption.(8) 
Under these debilitating conditions， the widespread cal for policies 
focusing on renewed growth brought a response from the U. S. 
Treasury Secretary James Baker. At the annual meeting of the 
World Bank and the IMF in Seoul in October 1985， he announced the 
so-calIed Baker lnitiative which was to provide $29 billion over three 
years to 15 heavily indebted countries， ten of which were in Latin 
America. However， the Baker Initiative never succeeded except in 
the case of Mexico， where the United States has a special relationship 
and particular economic interests. Under initiatives subsequent to 
the failure of the Baker initiative -一 the“Menu Approach" and the 
“Brady plan川町一一一newmoney was not provided to Latin American 
countries in the amounts envisioned. ln May 1987， Citicorp chairman 
J ohn Reed announced that the bank would add $3 bi1lion to its loan 
? ? ?
???
The W or1d Bank， 198. ( 8 ) 
Japanese Substitution of MultilateraIism for Bilateralism 
los5 reserves， equivalent to 20 percent of its Third World loan 
exposure.(lO) Other U. S. major banks followed Citicorp's lead. 
This evolution of the debt problem suggested that private banks in 
the U. S. were so reluctant to provide new money that debt problems 
required involvement of another actor， that is， Japan， the largest 
creditor in the world.(ll) The enormous Japanese capital surplus drew 
the attention of the U. S.， which was interested in whether and how 
a portion of th白 efunds might be channeled to deal with the debt 
problems and capital requirements of the developing countries. lt 
was this time that an American business leader， James Robinson， 
Chairman of American Express， sounded an influential calI for J apan 
to launch a Marshall Plan， which he termed a Global Security lnitia-
tive.(12) 
??
?
? ?
The Brady Plan in April1989 adopted a similar idea to Miyazawa's. 
Following the $30 billion recycling plan， Finance Minister， Kiich 
Miyazawa announced the Miyazawa Plan at the Toronto Summit in 
]une 1988. The basic idea was to trade old loans of Latin American 
countries at a discount for new long-term bonds. The bonds would 
be guaranteed by reservl白 ofthe debtor countri出 depositedwith the 
IMF. The remainder of the debt would be rescheduled， and new 
loans would be provided by the international institutions and ]apan 
itself. At first， the plan was ignored at the Toronto Summit and 
openly attacked by American Treasury Secretary Brady. 
Fi仰 ndalTimes， May 22， 1987. 
As with data on U‘S. and ]apanese Banks' medium and long-teロn
loans outstanding to Latin America as of 1982， loans to Latin 
America were significantly more important for U. S. banks， when 
comparing Latin American Ioans to total banks assets (both domes-
tic and internationaI). See Stallings， 1987， p.8. 
His reasoning fo calling for a ] apanese initiative was based upon the 
fact that no nation was better positioned to spearhead the Global 
Security Initiative than ]apan; with its staggerig trade and capital 
surpluses， ]apan had substantial reasons for heading the charge; 
with the U. S. spending about 6% of its GNP on defense， ]apan's role 
over time would be to match in economic terms with the U. S. 
military contribution to security (Interview with Keidanren， ]une， 
1989). 
(9 ) 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
J¥ 
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With the steep increase of the trade surplus against the United 
States after 1980， Japanese government put the highest priority in 
foreign policies on reducing the surplus in order to maintain a good 
relationship with the U. S. Nevertheless， the trade surplus kept 
increasing remarkably even after the appreciation of the J apanese 
Yen since September 1985 and the J apanese government's strenuous 
efforts to stimulate domestic demand. ln 1987， the trade surplus with 
the U. S. reached the unprecedented level to $59.8 billionY3) ln the 
early 1980s， Japan had been running a current account surplus with 
the other industrialized countries and a deficit with the developing 
countries. But， with the worldwide drop in oil and other commodity 
prices and the yen's appreciation， by 1986 Japan began to run sur-
pluses with the developing countries as welI. Japan's current account 
balance grew from a $10.7 billion deficit in 1980 to a $20.8 bilIion 
surplus in 1983. It increased steadily thereafter to $85.8 billion in 
1986. On the other hand， inthe capital account， there was a net inflow 
of capital from the United States and Europe in 1980. But this was 
reversed by 1983 with the increasing current account surpluses. J apan 
became a net exporter of capital to the other industrialized countries. 
ln 1986， while the total capitaI flow from Japan was $130 bilIion， 
(13) This data draws on the International Monetary Fund， Direction 01 
Trade Statistics. Although the gap b巴tweenexports and imports did 
narrow from $59.8 billion in 1987 to $55.4 billion in 1988 after eight 
years of successive growth， improvement was unexpectedly modest 
given al the factors working in favor of a small巴rshortfall. 
According to Keidanren's estimate， by itself the roughly 50 percent 
drop in the value of the dollar against the yen since September 1985 
should have shrunk the deficit by more than $4.4 bilion. This 
unpredictable consequence was in c1ear contrast to the U. S. trade 
deficit with European Community， where the trade imbalance has 
been corrected with remarkable speed. Furthrmore， inconsidering 
the robust domestic demand in ] aan， the cumulative effects of seven 
]apanese market access packages dating back to December 1981 and 
the enhanced competitiveness of American manufactures， the stage 
seemingly was set for a major correction in the bilateral trade 
account. 
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three quarters of it went to the United States and the EC countries 
and only $7.6 billion， or6% of the $130 billion went to the developing 
countries.(14) To make matters worse for the developing countries， in
1986， global financial flow reversed and capital went from developing 
countries to developed countries as a result of capital flight and 
retrenchment in commercial lending. The net inflow to developing 
countries amounted to $30 billion in 1980-81. However， the tide 
shifted completely by 1985-86 with $30 billion in net outflows from 
the developing countries. This figure was then projected to rise to 
$40 billion a year by 1991.(15) 
However， the problem in recycling Japanese capital surpluses was 
the fact that most of this capital surplus was held by the private 
sector. N et external assets held by the private sector accounted for 
$105 billion of the $130 billion surplus as of 1986.(16) The fact that 
these funds were privately held and were responsive to but not 
controlled by government policies and actions made it more difficult 
for the J apanese government to harness the financial resources for 
serving to U. S. economic interests. While the United States had 
limited success in persuading commercial banks to lend additional 
amounts to developing countries， Japanese banks were no more eager 
than their American counterparts. 1n response to this policy dilemma 
facing the Japanese government， Japanese private sector interests 
formulated one position paper saying that unless the J apanese Gov-
ernment provided the necessary environment that would encourage 
Japanese capital movements into developing countries， itwould be 
very difficult to increase the flow of Japanese capital into these 
countries at a time of the international debt problem.(17) 
The J apanese government and the business community had real創
ized the limitation of policies for reducing the trade surplus by the 
adjustment of the exchange rate and the expansion of domestic ~ 
J¥ 
(14) The Export-Import Bank of Japan， 1989a 
(15) Interview with Keidanren， June 1989. 
(16) Keidanren， October 1988. 
(17) Keidanren， 1987. 
}ミ
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demandYS) Nonetheless， despite these misgivings， U. S. pressure 
forced the Japanese government to continue to foIIow stimulative 
economic policies. SpecificaIIy， the government outlined two measur-
cs related to the expansion of domestic demand on two occasions. 
First， during three years from 1986 through 1988， the official discount 
rate was lowered five times; four times in 1986， once in 1987‘ 
Second， the J apanese govemment adopted “Emergency Economic 
Measures" in May 1987 with the intention of implementing immediate 
measures to stimulate domestic demand， accompanied by fiscal 
measures amounting to more than Y6 triIion (about $46 bilIion at 
then exchange rate). While those two policies were considered to 
have been successful in reducing poIitical tension between Japan and 
the United States， we can discern a new strategy in the Emergency 
Economic Measures in 1987， that is Japanese multilateralism 
As the limited effects of the emergency measures on rectifying the 
imbalance， and as pressures from both the domestic and international 
business community mounted， the J apanese government was deter司
mined to estabIish some mechanism to mobilize the funds held by the 
private sector. Japan responded by announcing and implementing a 
“$30 bilIion recyc1ing program，" a three year program to recyc1e 
capital to developing countries. AIso， Saburo Okita， former Minister 
of Foreign Affairs， proposed “Okita Plan，" a $125 bilIion recyc1ing 
scheme over five years to channel the Japanese capital surplus to 
developing countries. The details of these plans and their assump肉
tions wilI be discussed below. 
Emergent Multilateralism: Cooperation 
tional Financial Organizations 
A. $30 billion Recyc1ing Plan to Developing Countries(19) 
Former Prime Minister Nakasone announced the plan during his 
May 1987 visit to Washington to recycle $30 billion (combined with 
the $10 billion plan announced in 1986) over three years to developing 
countries， with the detaiIs of this plan presented on June 9 at the 
Interna-with 3_ 
???
??
?
Interview with Keidanren， June 1989. (18) 
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Venice Summit. It should be noticed that， although the purpose of the 
recycling program， as it was explained by the J apanese government， 
was to encourage J apanese capital movements to developing coun-
tries， the plan was positioned as a part of a Y6 tril1ion package of the 
above-mentioned emergency measures adopted by the Cabinet on 
May 29， 1987. This stimulus package was prepared for the summit 
meeting as a key element in the J apanese Government's plan to 
demonstrate that the J apanese were determined to boost domestic 
demand and to reduce the trade deficit， inspite of the fact that the 
Japanese government had realized the 1imitations of the effectiveness 
of such measures. In this context， the ultimate purpose of the 
recycling plan was not to direct the capital surplus towards debt 
-ridden counties but to ease the bilateral tension with the United 
States through a multilateralist gesture. There are two parts to the 
J apanese recycling program : 
(i) 担旦bil1io旦， announced in 1986， consisting of contributions and 
subscriptions to the multi1ateral development agencies， such as the 
World Bank， the Asian Development Bank (ADB)， and the IMF. Out 
of the $10 bil1ion， $2 billion was allocated for the Japan Special Funds 
within the World Bank. This was additional borrowing authority up 
to Y300 billion over three years in J apanese financial markets. 
Agreement was signed in J une， 1987; $0.2 bi1lion was for grant funds 
to the W orld Bank for co-financing of the W orld Bank's projects. 
International Development Association (IDA) countries were not 
eligible for this funding. These funds were for technical assistance， 
feasibility studies， sectoral and structural adjustment and disaster 
assistance.. The funding came from the Japanese government's 
budget; $3.6 billion was for 1恥1Fspecial lending. Total of SDR 3 
(1ω9) Fo 伽 ingd 制 d 町 sona r町m問聞町n田附附l児町e釘rmo
a討tionDepartment， Keidanren，“Shikin Kanryu Keikaku no Gaiyo 
[Outline of the Capita Surplus Recycling PlanJ" and intervIews with 
staffs of the department， June 1989. The total amount dose not add 
up to exact $30 billion， because the amount was set first as a goal 
before designing details. 
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billion for the IMF special facility for critical situations that required 
financial support beyond the usual recourse. Funds came from the 
Foreign Exchange Special Account (gai};:oku kawase tokubetsu kaikei) ; 
$2.6 billion was for J apan's contribution to the eighth replenishment 
of IDA (21% of the total); $1.3 billion Japan's contribution to the 
Asian Development Fund.(20) 
(ii) $20 billion， announced in 1987. Like the $10 billion recycling， this 
was provided through the multilateral development banks. $8 bilIion 
of the total was al!ocated for creating funds similar to the Japan 
Special Funds at the W orld Bank also in the Asian Development 
Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. Roughly $7 billion 
of this total was supposed to be private funds raised on the Tokyo 
market， while the remainder consisted of government contributions 
to the capital subscriptions of the multilateral development banks; 
$9 billion was funds for co-financing from the Overseas Economic 
Cooperation Fund (OECF)， the Export-Import bank of Japan (Exim 
Bank)， and private banks with multilateral development banks' lend-
ing. Roughly two-thirds of these funds could be expected from Exim 
Bank， and one-third from OECF ;(21) $3 billion was for direct untied 
loans by the Exim Bank. Large portion of the funds， at least 40 
percent of the loan extended by the Exim Bank， were expected to go 
to Latin American countries， that is， the ‘back yard' of the United 
States.(22) 
The Asian Development Fund is a special fund established within the 
ADB that specializes in provision of concessive loans for m巴mber
countries in the Asian Development Bank 
OECF funds are counted as offieial development assistance (ODA)， 
while Exim funds are not. 
To avoid the irpression of an undue emphasis on Latin American 
countries， the J apanese govεrnm巴ntannounced with the above plan 
its intention to increas巴itsgrants to Sub-Saharan Africa and the 
least developed countries by事500million. These were designed to be 
on'-project grants for a th日eyear period from 1987 to help in 
structural adjustment. These funds were not channeled through the 
W orld Bank， but were being provided through the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
(20) 
(21) 
(22) 
???
( 
一一一) 
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1n short， the entire amount of the $30 bilIion recycling plan was 
channeled through or in close consultation with the multilateral 
development banks. This concentration on the multilateral develop. 
ment banks was noteworthy in shifting ways of resource allocation 
by the Japanese government.(23) 
B. The Okita Plan 
Saburo Okita， the former Japanese Foreign Minister， proposed in 
September 1987 that Japan launch a $125 billion five year plan to 
transfer resources to developing countries， at annual rate of $25 
billion. Okita's proposal came from a study group he had chaired 
under the auspices of the World 1nstitute for Development Economic 
Research (WIDER)， an arm of the United Nations University in 
Tokyo. The WIDER report，“Mobilizing 1nternational Surplus for 
World Development: a W1DEP Plan for a Japanese 1nitiative，" was 
issued on May 7，1987， a few days after Prime Minister Nakasone had 
presented his $30 bilIion plan in Washington. The upstaging was of 
course no coincidence. Okita was called a“boss" in the realm of 
bureaucracy， because he had held various important positions in the 
field of Japanese foreign aid; among others President of OECF and 
the Chairman for Council for Overseas Economic Cooperation (taigai 
keizai ky。ηIOkushiηgi，如i). Policy recommendations under his name 
had been highly respected among the bureaucrats concerned. Among 
the many policy proposals dealing with Japanese aid in 1987， Okita's 
suggestion was one of the most influentiaI， and proposal was care-
fully discussed not only by government officiaIs but by the business 
(23) Although the outstanding feature of this plan was the close collabo回
ration with multilateral development banks， itdid not tilt the bal. 
ance towards the mutilateral channels at all. The ]apanese alloca. 一
tion ratio between multilateral and bilateral aid of 3: 7 was ~ 
maintained even after the implementation of the plan. The share of 
multilateral assistance in ]apan's total ODA in 1985-87 was: 32.7% 
in 1985， 31.7% in 1986， and 29.6% in 1987. Therefore， bereaucratic 一
conflict between bureaus in charge of regions andせlosethat contact 
with multilateral organizations could be avoided. 
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community， because it dealt explicitly with key questions such as 
undesirability of a sharp fal in the current account surplus.(24) 
Although there were a number of innovative financing elements to 
the Okita Plan， the methods and principle of recycling the capital 
surplus followed closely the mechanisms instituted by the ]apanese 
government's $30 billion recycling plan， that is， close cooperation 
with multilateral financiaJ instiututions. The plan called for a three 
part program : 
(i) The ]apanese Trust Fund would raise funds on the Tokyo 
market using guarantees from ]apanese government agencies. 
Developing countries might borrow from the ]apanese commercial 
banking system against the collateral of zero coupon bonds issued by 
the fund.附 WIDERestimated出atthis mechanism could raise $10 
billion annually， or$50 billion over five years. 
(i) The Export Import Bank of ]apan w'ould increase its coイinanc-
ing arrangements beyond its 1987 levels of $2 billion per year. 
WIDER calculated出ata co-financing program of $10 bi1lion per 
year was quite realistic， given the $150 billion annual flow of funds 
into the government's Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (Zaisei 
Toyushi)， which includes postal savings， government pension funds， 
and other collections. The Exim Bank had unutilized guarantee 
power of about $40 billion. The report pointed out that a major 
advantage of co-financing was that it was not limited by the capital 
adequacy of the multilateral development banks. This was an impor-
tant element of the scheme since the W orld Bank was lending close 
to its capital ceiling at the present 1 : 1 gearing ratio. On the other 
The report articulates that“[Japan's] surplus isnow viewed in a 
negative Iight-because it is associated with ]apan's export drive and 
the problems caused in other industrial countries by ] apan's super 
-competitiveness. Instead， the potential of the surplus for world 
economy should be emphasized" (WIDER 1987， p.5). 
The amounts borrowed would be a substantial multiple of the invest-
ment needed to buy these bonds， whose face value on maturity wil 
be equivalent to the principal borrowed， therely fuly securing repay-
ment of the principal. 
(24) 
(25) 
??????
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hand， decisions on co-financing were within the discretion of the 
Exim Bank and the J apanese government. 
(iI) The 1MF should be permitted to borrow in J apan's capitaI 
market at a rate of $5 bilIion annuaIIy to provide the program Iending 
to low income developing countries， using the 1MF's Extended Finan-
cing Facility.(26) 
The plan emphasized the need to find an outlet for J apan's current 
account surplus， and concluded that as domestic demand in J apan 
could not be sufficient to absorb the J apanese surplus， itwas neces-
sary to boost demand in deveJoping countries through a major recy-
cling plan that asked intermediate roJes played by multilateral finan-
ciaI institutions. 
Both the $30 bilIion recycIing plan and the Okita plan represented 
Japan's interests in extending internationaI cooperation that brings 
Iitle relative gains to the J apanese government in internationaI 
relations， Iet alone to the Japanese economy. PoliticaIIy， since Japan's 
participation at senior IeveJs in the W orld Bank and the 1MF has 
been quite Iimited， the multilateraI development banks could use the 
recycIing money， tosome extent， attheir discretion. 1n other words， 
Japanese government interests Iay not in how the money was to be 
used， but in how much money was to be recycled. The recycling 
money was mereJy bestowed upon the multilateraI organizations by 
the Japanese government. For example， as far as the Ministry of 
Finance is concerned， it is generaIIy believed that the posts in the 
internationaI organization do not lead to the “fast track" in bureau-
crats' future careers. As few people became Director←general of a 
bureau in the ministry after the service in multilateral organizations， 
the position in such organizations have been regarded as a dead end 
J¥ 
(26) The Study Group also called for a Debt Reconstruction Facility， =:
which would retire LDC debt through the issuance of long-term :.; 
bonds. This proposal called for participation by the U. S.， ]apan and 
other countries， and would aim to provide relief from current debt 
The Tsukuba Review of Law and PoJiticaJ Science， No. 23， 1997 
。fcareer path.(27) The underrepresentation of Japanese nationality in 
international organizations leads to difficulty in affecting decision 
-making process within them and thus in strengthening voting power 
of Japan. For example， in1986， Japan raised its contributions to the 
World Bank's International Development Association (IDA) by $350 
million， becoming 1DA's largest supporter with a total subscription of 
$2.6 billion. 1n response the United States agreed to decrease its 
share of voting rights in the W orld Bank so that J apan's share could 
be raised --but only after the veto threshold to ensure continued 
American control was also agreed.(28) 1n June of 1987 Japan took 
another initiative at the W orld Bank， when it became the first induシ
trialized country to ratify the convention establishing the Multilat-
eral 1nvestment Guarantee Agency (M1GA). However， itdid neither 
change Japan's voting power nor increase its voice in the World 
Bank. 
Also Japan's financial cooperation with multilateral organizations 
realized litle economic gains， atleast in a short term. The expecta-
tion that a large percentage， at least a quarter of the $20 billion 
announced in 1987， was supposed to come from the Japanese private 
sector suggests that this policy was formulated by the J apanese 
government-business complex with close consultation.(29) However， 
this time the close relations between the government and business 
failed to realize domestic interests but aimed to contribute to sustain-
ing international economic order. On the one hand， increased borrow-
ing by the multilateral development banks from the Tokyo market or 
When the W orJd Bank offered the post of the Executive Vice 
President to Toyoo Gyoten， the Deputy Vice-Minister for financial 
Affairs at the Ministr at that time， just after the announcement of 
the recycling plan， the Ministry refused the request and proposed 
instead a lower-level official in his place. Gyoten was simply too 
high in rank to accept the proposal. Interview with Keidanren， June 
1989. 
Japan Economic Institute， jEI Rゆort，No. 20F， 20 May 1988; the 
World Bank， 1988 
Interview with Keddanren， June 1989. 
(27) 
(28) 
(29) 
? ? ?
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co-financing with the Exim Bank allowed the J apanese government 
to tap private market without requiring new budget authority or 
Japanese government guarantees. The government's role in mapping 
out this scheme was only to decide plausible total amounts of the 
recycling money using normal consultative channels between the 
Ministry of Finance and the private banks. On the other hand， the 
J apanese government insisted repeatedly that these funds were to be 
in the form of untied aid so that the recycling plans would be 
understood by U. S. Congress not as an export promoting policy but 
as a new approach based on multilateralism.(30) It was agreed 
between the Japanese government and the World Bank that procure-
ment under this new program would he supervised by the W orld 
Bank. 
4. Decreasing Bilateralism: Financial flows to Latin Amer-
Ica 
In contrast to the enhanced multilateralism， decreasing bilater-
alism has been the other side of the same coin of J apanese foreign 
economic assistance policy since the late 1980s. While a huge amount 
of J apan's surplus capital was recycled through multilateral financial 
institutions， litle political attention was paid on a bilateral basis to 
improve deteriorating economic conditions in Latin American coun-
tries. During a period in which it has generated huge current account 
surpluses and long-term capital outflows， Japan invested primarily in 
industrialized countries， particularly in the United States and Europe 
rather than increased capital flows to developing countries圃 In1987， 
45 percent of long-term capital outflows went to the United States 
and 25 percent to EC countries. In comparison to 1983 levels， this 
represented an increase in percentage of capital flows to the United 
States from 31 percent and to the EC countries from 16 percent. The ニ
J¥ 
percentage toward the developing countries decreased from 57 per-。
(30) ]apan had been severely criticized by OECD countries for directly or さ
indirectly tying its aid， especially for permitting feasibility studies by 
]apanese consultants to tailor projects to ]apanese specifications. 
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cent in 1983 to 17 percent in 1987.(31) 
Japanese reluctance toward developing countries in the 1980s was 
particularly true to decreased foreign direct investment in Latin 
America. In the 1980s， generally， while Japanese investment in North 
America continued to be almost half of the total for the period， and 
investment to Asia and Europe almost doubled their shares over the 
period， investment in Latin America， apart from that seeking tax 
havens， remained low. Especially， in1987， with volume remaining at 
the same level as the previous year， Latin America's share of total 
investment fel drastically form 21.2% in 1986 to 14.4%. Thus， itfel 
in the ranking by region from second place， maintaining up to 1986， 
down to fourth place below Europe and Asia(32) (See Figure 1). 
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(31) 
(32) 
The Export-Import Bank of ]apan， 1989a. 
As to absolute amount， investment in Latin America in fiscal 1987 
came to a new record high for the sixth year in succession， with a 
total of $4，816 million， though this was only $79 million greater than 
the previous year's total. 
??????
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The main reasons for the overall drop in investment 1987 were 
decrease in investment in manufacturing decreased from $273 million 
to $161 million， and in resource development from $114 to $33 
million.(33) Large-scale Japanese “national projects" in the region in 
the late 70s and early 80s， such as the Peruvian oil pipeline， the 
Mexican port and pipeline facilities， the Sicartsa steel complex in 
western Mexico， the Cerrado agricultural complex in central Brazil 
and the Carajas multi-resource project in the Amazon basin， could 
not be initiated without corresponding bank lending.(34) 
Therefore， Barbara Stalling's statement that “<b>oth the pre 
-1982 and post-1982 periods clearly reveal the influence of the United 
States. Japanese banks got into Latin America lending by following 
the lead of their U. S. counterparts"(35) might be persuasive no later 
than 1987 when the Japanese private flows began to shrink. 
??????
5. Conclusion 
The American view of J apan as a nation where the market 
mechanism does not work and which poses a threat to American 
interests has been growing just as the perception of the Soviet 
military threat has ebbed. Japan's reactions to the U. S. criticism has 
been based upon multilateralism since the late 1980s， claiming that 
rectifying bilateral conflicts with the United States must be compat-
ible with sustaining existing international economic order. For 
instance， ina field of international trade， the United States targeted 
supercomputers， communication satellites and forest products for 
bilateral negotiations under the terms of Super 301 provision of the 
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988， even if it was 
readily acknowledged that the trade barriers explain only a small 
part of he persistent U. S. trade deficit with J apan. In addition， 
negotiations were being held on alleged “structural impediments" in 
Japan's distribution system， keiretsu issue， etc. In the U. S. view， the 
The Export-'lmport Bank of ]apan， 1989b. 
Wellons， 1988; Holl巴rman，1988. 
Stallings， 1987， p.35 
(3) 
(34) 
(35) 
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only way to overcome such trade-distorting practices might be to set 
numerical import goals for J apan， that is，“managed trade. "(36) 
In contrast to the above U. S. views that have inc1ined to bilateral 
solutions， J apanese views and reservations on this situation could be 
summarized as multilateral. The multilateralism has been pervasive 
even among J apanese business田ctorwhich used to rely on bilateral 
means to reduce economic conflicts with the United States， such as 
voluntary exports restrains on various manufactured goods on which 
Japan has high pride and competitiveness. For example， Keidanren's 
policy paper on international trade in the late 1980s c1early articulat-
ed that demanding bilateraI negotiations with threat of sanctions 
runs against the basic spirit of GATT， which provides for negotia-
tions on an equal footing among the contracting parties; in imposing 
sanctions on a trade partner， the U. S. is disregarding accepted 
GA TT procedures for resolving disputes which require explicit 
endorsement of other contracting parties before the sanction is 
effected; should the United States choose to impose sanctions， the 
depth of the two countries' economic interdependence today is such 
that the U. S. economy wi1l be affected as welI as ]apan， and the 
economy of Asia and many other countries will also be dealt a severe 
blow; therefore， talks should， to the fulIest extent possible， be car-
ried out under the supervision of GA TT orother third parties and 
should be conducted within a multilateral framework， and this would 
be in accordance with the internationallaw.(37) 
This policy stance makes it clear that J apan， as one of major 
beneficiaries of a liberal， multilateralist trading order， would“sustain 
the openness of the trading system and strengthen those regime 
mechanisms which will protect them from the arbitrary actions of its 
trading partners."(38) The contrast of the J apanese desire to seek a 
multilateral settlement with the U. S. persistence in seeking a bilat-
eral represents an example of the profound structural alteration in 
?????
?
The Economist， November 18， 1989. 
Keidanren， 1989. 
Haggard and Moon， 1983， p.135. 
(36) 
(37) 
(38) 
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the international poIitical economy. In this sense， the J apanese 
multiIateraIism of the foreign economic assistance policy of 1987 that 
1 have described above may actuaIIy portend the spread of universal 
multiIateraIism into other issue areas such as trade， environment， etc. 
In contrast， the United States found itself in a much Iess commanding 
position relative to its major economic partners than was the case 
during the creation and formative years of post-war international 
reglmes. 
The findings of this paper supports modified realistic (neoliberal 
-institutionalists) view that secondary powers in the current interna-
tional regimes are motivated to make contributions to maintaining 
the international poIitical economic order only because they find it in 
their interests to respond to external pressures imposed by structural 
change in the international system and to reciprocate cooperation 
based on strategic rationaiIty. In other words， the international 
regime can be stable when policy adjustments among industrialized 
states serves the decIining hegemon's own interests and are also 
sufficiently compatible with the interests of subordinate countries. In 
this sense， inthe field of the economic cooperation toward the Third 
W orld， the functional view of the international regimes developed by 
the liberal instiutionalists explains the Japanese foreign economic 
policies in the late 1980s well. 
Realist concern that growing Japanese participation in multilateraI 
institutions must at some point collides with declining American 
participation has not been materiaIized. Japan's real intention in 
using the multilateral organizations was to disburse the surplus 
money as quick as po田ible，not to expand its monetary authority to 
the multilateral organizations. It has been reported that Japan is now 
cIearly in a position that deserves a permanent status on the Security 
Council of the United Nations and/or president of the IMF or the 石
World Bank. However， Japan will achieve such status without 六
transcending American hegemonic power， but with invoking the :-
substitution of multiIateralism for bilateralism. 
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